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Abstract. Biometric information has become a technology complemen-
tary to cryptography, allowing to conveniently manage cryptographic
data. Two important needs are fulfilled: first of all, making such data
always readily available, and additionally, making its legitimate owner
easily identifiable. In this work we propose a signature system which
integrates face recognition biometrics with and identity-based signature
scheme, so the user’s face effectively becomes his public key and system
ID. Thus, other users may verify messages using photos of the claimed
sender, providing a reasonable trade-off between system security and us-
ability, as well as a much more straightforward public key authenticity
and distribution process.
Key words: digital signature, identity-based, face hashing, biometrics, signa-
ture validation, key generation
1 Introduction
At the present time, many transactions on the Internet, such as online banking
or shopping, are carried out assuming some degree of security. This is possible
by using secure schemes reliant on cryptographic data during the process, even
when the user is not tech-savvy or knowledgeable about it. Nevertheless some
requirements must be fulfilled in order for such schemes to actually be effective:
secret cryptographic data must be safely stored and it must be possible to clearly
establish a link between such cryptographic data and an identity. Even though
anybody may be able to generate a proper cryptographic key, some means must
exist to ensure who is its legitimate owner. Due to the nature of cryptographic
data, in many instances, such requirements directly work against the usability of
the system and require a minimum effort by end users. As the breadth of Internet
applications with security requireents starts to encompass much more casual
users, such as social networks, a compromise between usability and security mus
be reached.
To address these issues, biometric information, such as voice, face, iris or
fingerprint data, has become a complementary technology to cryptography [8,
9], offering a solution to the requirements of a secure system while, at the same
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time, making the technology more accessible and convenient. It may be possible
to forget a password or a shared key, but not to fail to recognize a friend’s face
or voice.
Most applications of biometric data in secure systems make special emphasis
in access control and data encryption. In such cases, biometrics are either com-
pared to a template database, or used to establish shared secret keys, assuming
that the legitimate user is the only one who holds that particular biometric data.
For example, a very common case is the use of fingerprint data, which is becom-
ing a staple in some laptop models as a means for login or data encryption.
However, secret key encryption cannot be applied to obtain other useful security
services such as non-repudiation or convenient authentication in a multi-party
environment, which require digital signature.
Signature schemes usually rely on public key cryptography, where each user
keeps a secret key for himself and distributes a public key among the other users.
However, one of the main issues in this kind of systems is precisely key authen-
tication, ensuring who is the owner of a particular public key. A very common
solution to this issue is the use of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) and digital
certificates [7]. This approach requires that users are, at least, able to understand
what the certificate’s content means and discern valid ones from invalid ones.
On the other hand, another interesting approach is the use of identity-based
schemes [10]. In such scheme, public keys are not randomly generated, but are
the user’s identifier itself (for example, the e-mail address). Therefore, the link
between any public key and the legitimate owner is immediate and does not
require any deep understanding of the underlying security system.
In this paper we present our work combing both approaches, biometrics and
identity-based systems, to get both of their advantages. Specifically, we have cho-
sen face biometrics as the user’s system identifier, and thus, the public key. The
main reason for this choice is the fact that, in contrast with other biometric data,
a face is public information which can be easily retrieved by means of a simple
photo. This is specially true now that most mobile phones already include a dig-
ital camera and social networks are attaining a high degree of popularity. Thus,
it is feasible to locate someone’s image, endorsed by all his contacts. Therefore,
under this system, public keys can be easily distributed and managed with a
high degree of usability. Furthermore, identifying who is the legitimate owner
becomes straightforward. However, the main interest in using this approach is,
precisely, that face information access is not limited to the real owner. Anyone
may acquire it, in contrast with other biometric data.
We would like that absolutely any face picture of the claimed user could be
used as his public key. However, this is currently imposible. For this goal, we
would need a system to get the same bit string from all the face images from
a particular person, as well as getting different ones from images from diffrent
subjects. Unfortunately, visual data, such face images, are highly unstable be-
cause of the acquisition conditions. For example, the presence of some highlights
or complements, such as glasses, make a face image to be very different to an-
other one of the same person. Because of these drawbacks we propose in this
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initial approach to use as public key a specific face image per subject, or, at
least, very similar ones taken under the same conditions. In this context, the
requirements of the face hashing system are the following: (i) to obtain different
strings for images of different subjects and (ii) to use just the face image as in-
formation of the subject to get the bits string of the user. Furthermore we would
like the system to be fast and with low computational demands. Thus, it could
be implemented in portable devices. In this context, we found in the literature
interesting approaches for face hashing [26, 25, 27], although they do not fulfil
all the above specified conditions. For this reason we developed a simple face
hashing algorithm that takes the desired conditions into account.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the cur-
rent work in combining biometrics with signature schemes and identity-based
systems, highlighting some of their strong points and limitations. Section 3
presents our approach to face biometrics data acquisition and the proposed face
hashing algorithm. An overview of the chosen identity-based scheme is provided
in Section 4. Some experimental results from the face hashing algorithm are ex-
posed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 outlines the conclusions and further work.
2 Related work
Currently, biometrics has many applications within the field of security. In gen-
eral, the research of this topic is focussed in two main issues: the generation
of symmetric keys which may be used to encrypt sensitive data [5, 6], and the
developement of access control systems via pattern recognition techniques [11,
12]. In the first case, biometric data usually acts as a replacement to passwords
and relies in the easy acquisition of data. In this context, we can find some ap-
proaches based on fingerprints or face biometrics [1], although the latter are less
common. In contrast, in the case of access control systems, we find a broader set
of choices on biometric data, mainly encompassing fingerprint, eye iris and face
recognition.
Nevertheless, we can find just a few attempts for signature schemes based
on biometric data. In [13], a general framework of digital signature generation
based on applying a fuzzy vault [16] scheme to biometric data is presented. Even
though the authors propose the use of fingerprints, it could be applied to any
kind of biometrics. However, upon closer inspection, the biometric data is only
used to provide standard access control via pattern matching to a keystore. No
biometric data is actually used to generate the secret key itself, or during sig-
nature processing. Once the keystore content is available, standard RSA [17] or
ElGamal [18] signature methods proceed, with biometric data having no addi-
tional role during the encrytion process.
Proposals which actually generate RSA secret keys from biometric data may
be found in [15, 14]. Instead of using random prime numbers to search for a
suitable RSA secret key, an iris reading is used. The former paper exposes the
general method, whereas the later proposes an actual implementation. Each time
a signature must be generated, the secret key is obtained from the biometric data.
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Apart from that, the scheme follows the standard RSA algorithm. In this case , it
is at the validation stage where biometric data plays no role. Following the same
principles, we can find approaches using ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)[20]
instead of RSA [15].
Notice that the exposed biometric signature schemes use different approaches
and different kinds of data to generate secret keys. However, they share a com-
mon requirement: they need a PKI to link any user’s public key to his or her
actual identity. In particular, biometric data is only used at the signing stage,
but not at the validation stage.
In this context, Shamir [10] proposed identity-based systems as an alternative
to PKI as a means to link public keys to identities. Instead of generating a secret
key from which the public key is inferred, the process is just the opposite. The
user chooses an identifier unique to him, which directly becomes his public key,
and then obtains the secret key from it. The chosen identifier is then made
publicly available. This is an approach which may be applied to biometrics if
we consider that some types of biometric data are a publicly available unique
identifier under some contexts, such as the face. Up to our knowledge, the current
literature on biometric identity-based systems do not take faces into account as
a mechanism to transmit the public key.
The notion of a biometric identity-based system signature scheme is proposed
in [2], which provides a complete description, including implementation details,
of how this goal may be achieved. However, the main biometric data the authors’
have in mind is fingerprints, since, under their scheme, anybody who has access
to the biometric data may generate valid secret keys. In fact, biometrics are
used at both the signature and validation stage, acting as both secret and public
key. Therefore, signature validation assumes collaboration of the signer, who
must be present in person during the process and requires an arbitrator who
corroborates the validity of the acquired data each time. Such requirement is a
very big constraint, and thus, the system does not fulfill our requirement that
biometric information can be easily accessed during validation.
A brief extension to the previous proposal is presented [3], still based on
fingerprints. Its main contribution is eliminating the need for an arbitrator at
the validation stage. This is achieved by proposing a scheme where it is possible
to deduce the original biometrics from the validating public key. Nevertheless,
signer presence is still required, since fingerprints must be read at the validation
stage. Following the idea of using fingerprint data, an authentication scheme,
also under an identity-based system, is proposed in [4].
3 Hashing Algorithm for Face Images
In this paper we propose to use face images as the user’s public key. However, it
is not feasible to directly use the face images because of their size. Notice that
the scheme proposed by Shamir accounted for ID’s characters strings with the
size of an standard username or an e-mail address. Therefore, each face image
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must be previously processed to obtain a face hash, with a much smaller size,
which will be the actual input for the validation algorithm.
This section describes the proposed method for face hashing. In this first
approach, our goal is to obtain a binary string from a face image such that
– Face image strings obtained from different subjects have to be different
– The hash function has to use just the face image as user-specific informa-
tion. Non additional user-specific data can be used for the binary string
generation, given that the public key of our system is specifically the face
image.
Furthermore, for our future work, we would like to obtain highly correlated
bit strings for different face images of the same person.
The proposed hashing method uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
[22] to reduce the initial data dimensionality. Next subsection briefly describes
PCA and then we detail the our face hashing proposal.
3.1 Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a non-supervised linear feature extrac-
tion technique. It is frequently applied in classification and clustering problems
given its simplicity and optimality.
The method seeks a linear transformation of the data keeping as much infor-
mation as possible under the Euclidean reconstruction criterion. Concretely, it
finds an orthogonal set of projection vectors computed as the first eigenvectors
of the data covariance matrix. These eigenvectors are sorted by their respective
eigenvalues, to preserve the maximum possible amount of the data variance.
In this context, all the data can be projected to the lower dimensional feature
space generated by the first eigenvectors. This new data representation is called
eigenrepresentation, while the new feature space is called eigenprojections space
or eigenspace.
The use of these technique is specially suitable to process visual data, in
order to reduce redundancy and noise. For this reason we transform the face
images using this method for the bit string computation.
3.2 Face Hashing Method
Our face hasing algorithm is inspired by the work of Goh and Ngo [23]. Briefly,
their procedure is based on iterated inner-products between pseudorandom and
user-specific eigenprojections. Thus, given a face image, they project the image in
the eigenprojection space and segment this new representation computing inner
products with subject-specific random normalized vectors. Then, using empirical
thresholds, they binarize each of these inner products in 0/1, to construct the
hash string.
We chose this bio-hash algorithm as our starting point due to its functional
advantages compared to other methods in terms of consistency and simplicity.
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However, we can not directly apply this system for our purpose, given that we
do not want to use additional user-specific information except of the face image
to construct the hash code. More concretely, we want the public key to be just
the face image, and not both the face image and some additional information of
the user. Thus, we need a bio-hashing algorithm that uses just the face image
to obtain the bits string.
Taking into account the requirements of our signature scheme, in this first
approach we propose to construct the bit string from a face image computing
inner products between the eigenrepresentation of the face image and a general
set of random vectors. After that, another set of general random vectors will be
used to compute specific thresholds for binarizing the inner products.
Following we detail the proposed method to get the bits string of a face image
I in grey intensities. In particular, we supose that the size of the image I is n×m
pixels and denote D = nm ∈ R.
Parameters of the algorithm:
– Eigenspace dimensionality d ∈ N, and the corresponding PCA transforma-
tion found previously using face images. This new dimensionality has to
verify that d < D.
– Predefined bits string length, N ∈ N
– A set of random vectors: U = {u1, . . . ,uN}; ui ∈ Rd, for all i = 1, ..., N .
Algorithm:
1. Express I as a features vector x ∈ RD, where D = nm, concatenating the
different columns of I. This process is illustrated in Figure 1.
2. Project x to the eigenspace of dimensionality d, using the previously learned
PCA transformation, obtaining y ∈ Rd.
3. Compute a1, ..., aN calculating the following inner products
ai =< y,ui >∈ R
for all i,= 1, ..., N .
4. Compute each bit bi of the hash string by
bi =
{
1 if ai ≥ 0
0 otherwise
for i = 1, ..., N .
Output: The algorithms returns the bits string of the input image I,
(b1, ...., bN )
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Fig. 1. Initial features vector construction from the face image in grey intensities.
4 Identity-based scheme
In this section we describe the identity-based signature and validation scheme
(IBS), once we are able to process the face image of a system user u to calculate
a proper face hash, BIOu. The face image used to derive BIOu directly becomes
user u’s public key in the scheme, being made publicly available to other system
users. A face image conforms to the identity-based system requirement that it
uniquely identifies a user and can be undeniably associated with him.
The scheme is formalized as a set of algorithms:
IBS = (Setup,KeyDer, Sign, V f).
– The Setup algorithm produces the master secret and public parameters
(MSP,MPP ) from a security parameter K.
– The KeyDer algorithm is able to generate a user u’s secret key, SKu, from
MSP and BIOu.
– The Sign algorithm is the signature one, which produces a signature σ given
the input of a message M and SKu.
– The V f algorithm is the signature validation process, returning true if it is
deemed valid, or false if invalid.
IBS should conform to the following requirements and properties:
– Correctness: Any signature produced by a signing user u must be accepted
by the validating algorithm using the biometric hash from u, BIOu. Thus,
V f(MPP,BIOu, Sign(M,SKu)) must return true.
– Uniqueness: Any given signature produced by u may only validate using
BIOu.
– Unforgeability: Only using the system’s master public parameters, MPP , it
is not feasible for anyone else but u to construct signature which will validate
using BIOu
– Non-repudiation: A signing user u cannot deny he produced any signature
which validates using BIOu.
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The last property, non-repudiation, is actually a consequence of the former
three ones. However, we explicitly state it since it is the main goal of our proposal.
Users in the system may prove signature ownership to third parties, without the
need for direct arbitration from a trusted entity.
4.1 Signature processing
The signature processing method based on face hashing can be divided in four
stages, one for each algorithm in IBS: Setup, Key Derivation, Signature and
Validation. For our system, we have decided to use the original scheme proposed
by Shamir, as it is a simple one which allows us to easily test how an approach
based on face biometrics responds to an identity-based system.
Setup: This is the first step before the identity-based system may be used. it
requires the deployment of a trusted entity, the Key Generation Center (KGC)
which initializes the system parameters, (MSP,MPP ). In the context of a social
network, the administrator would take the role of the KGS.
1. Two large primes are chosen, their product being n.
2. Two integers e and d, so that gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1 and ed = 1 mod ϕ(n), are
chosen.
3. A hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zϕ(n) is chosen.
4. The system parameters are considered initialized: MSP = (d) and MPP =
(n, e, h).
Key Derivation: Whenever a new user u joins the system, his secret key must
be derived from the public biometric data (the face), using the KeyDer algo-
rithm, before he can sign data. This step implies that, apart from the required
personal information, he also provides a photo at registration, which will be
processed by the KGS. Once the photo is available, this process follows.
1. The face image is processed according to the method presented in Section 3.
The user biohash BIOu is obtained, in the form of a bit array.
2. The user secret key is calculated using the following operation: SKu =
BIOu
d mod n
3. Once registration has been successfully completed, the user is provided with
SKu and MPP , the latter already generated at the Setup stage.
Signature: Whenever a user u wants to sign message m to some other user
within the system, the following calculations are completed.
1. The user chooses a random number r.
2. Value t = re mod n is calculated.
3. Value s = SKu ∗ rh(t||m) mod n is calculated.
4. (t, s) is considered the signature.
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Validation: Before signed message validation may occur, users must exchange
their images. In the context of a social network, this may be automatically
achieved by accessing the contact’s profile, or just directly sending the image
file. At an in person meeting, a photo may be taken with a mobile phone and
stored for later usage.
Whenever a user recieves a signed message from another user u, it may be
validated in the following manner.
1. User u’s photo is retrieved.
2. The claimed identity is checked by looking and the photo and corroborating
that the person who appears is, in fact, u. This step can be completed by
the validating user himself.
3. The BIOu is derived from the image using the method described in Section
3.
4. The signature is validated evaluating the expression se = BIOu ∗ th(t||m)
mod n. If the expression is valid, then so is the signature.
5 Experiments
We tested the proposed system with the FRGC [21] database. Concretely, we
used the subset of images acquired under controlled conditions. It is composed
of 3772 images from 275 subjects, having from 2 to 16 images per person. The
faces have been aligned according to the eyes and resized at a resolution of
81 × 77 pixels. Notice that this process can be performed automatically using
eye detection algorithms [24].
For this experimental validation, we used just the internal face features, com-
posed by eyes, nose and mouth. Figure 2 includes some examples of images in
the FRGC database after being aligned, resized and cropped.
Fig. 2. Examples of images from the FRGC database after being aligned, resized and
cropped.
The experiments are performed to show that the proposed procedure pro-
duces different codes for different subjects. Furthermore, we also want to eval-
uate the choice of parameters d and N . For this goal, we randomly selected
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one image per each of the 275 subjects and compute the Hamming distances
between their corresponding bit string, using different parameters. These values
are called the inter class Hamming distances.
First, we make an experiment to explicitly evaluate the choice of parameters
d and N . For this aim we computed the inter class Hamming distances for
different values of d and N . Tables 1 are detailed the the mean and the standard
deviation of these distances.
Table 1. Mean(mean) and standard deviation (std) of the inter-class Hamming dis-
tances for different values of d and N .
N 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
d = 50 mean
std
250.2
55.2
500.4
109.5
750.6
160.5
1001.0
214.6
1251.3
270.1
d = 100 mean
std
250.3
49.4
500.5
100.9
750.9
153.5
1001.2
197.5
1251.4
249.0
d = 150 mean
std
250.3
50.8
500.7
97.1
750.9
146.3
1001.3
194.8
1251.5
245.6
d = 200 mean
std
250.3
49.5
500.7
96.3
751.1
143.5
1001.1
198.4
1251.7
236.6
d = 250 mean
std
250.3
47.6
500.6
95.2
751.1
143.9
1001.3
191.5
1251.4
240.1
Notice that the Hamming distances are most dependant of N than of d. In
particular, for a fixed d the distances increase depends linearly on N . This can be
more easily seen in Figure 3, where we show the evolution of the maximum, the
minimum and the mean inter-class Hamming distances for d = 250. Concretely,
we observe in this case that the inter-class Hamming distances are, at least, 10%
of N .
5.1 Intra-Class Hamming Distances
In this first approach our system uses always the same image per subject as a
public key. However, in the future, we want that the public key of the user could
be any image of his or her face. For this aim, we need to find a face hashing
function that produces exactly the same bit string for different images from the
same person, which is currently an open problem.
In this context, we have performed one experiment to evaluate the intra-
class Hamming distances obtained with the proposed algorithm. That is, the
Hamming distances of strings obtained with different images of the same subject.
Thus, for all the images of subject in the database we computed the corre-
sponding strings following the proposed algorithm. Then, for each subject, we
compute the different Hamming distances among the strings obtained with his or
her images. After that we computed the mean, the minimum and the maximum
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the inter-class Hamming distances in function of the code length
N , for d = 250.
Hamming distances per subject. The parameters selected for this experiment
where d = 250 and N = 3000.
In Figure 4 we show the histograms of these distances.
As expected, our method never gets the same string for different images from
the same person. However, the intra-class Hamming distance is always less than
423. Notice that, using the same parameters, the inter-class Hamming distance
was always higher than 304 (see Figure 3). Then, comparing these results, we
can see that, with our system, the intra-class Hamming distance is in general
significantly lower than the inter-class Hamming distance.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a basic framework for digital signature generation and val-
idation reliant of face biometrics. This is achieved by using an identity-based
system. The main novelty of our approach is the fact that, in this case, it is
not based in private biometric data, difficult to access or requiring the signer’s
collaboration at the validation stage. On the contrary, it relies on easily available
data. Up to our knowledge, no other identity-based biometric signature system
uses face data, just fingerprints.
The main advantage of our system is providing a very intuitive method to
link personal identities to public keys, which meshes well with current popular
systems such as social networks, where friends already share their photos as part
of their daily activities. Furthermore, for human beings, a face is easier to retrieve
and recognize than random data. It must be also taken into account that face
biometric data is much easier to acquire than any other sample type, even by
non tech-savvy users in impromptu situations. A phone camera, an increasingly
common element, is enough. In fact, a public key/certificate keystore may not
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(A)
(B)
(C)
Fig. 4. Histograms of the mean (A), minimum (B) and maximum (C ) Intra-Class
Hamming distances.
Visualizing key authenticity: turning your face into your public key. 13
need be necessary, in contrast with traditional systems. Whenever a friend’s
public key must be retrieved, the key’s authenticity is implicit.
For our aims we proposed a fast algorithm for face image hashing. The
method can manage large amounts of images and may be easily implemented
with low computational loads in portable devices. We made some experiments
to test the performance of the method. The results showed that our method
produces different bits strings for different subjects, while the obtained strings
of different images from the same subjects are highly correlated.
Further work includes improving the data acquisition process to increase the
breadth of image types which can be processed by our system to generate proper
secret keys. Additionally, more modern identity-based signature schemes, such
as the ones based on well pairings, could be tested. We also feel it would be
important to study how the system can be further integrated with the current
social networks’ workings. For example, how a complete stranger may guarantee
that someone’s photo belongs to the claimed identity, instead of assuming a
former personal relationship.
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